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Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban Amer-
ica: A Comparative Study of New York 
City and philadelphia Politics
Justin Greenman
Introduction:
 The decades before the American Civil War would be a 
period of great change for America’s two largest cities, New York 
City and Philadelphia. At the turn of the 19th century, New York 
City was still socially homogenous, with few immigrants and a 
uniform, simple economy. But, as its economic and social power 
grew with the development of new industries and the growth 
of interstate commerce, immigration to the city skyrocketed. 
Immigrants flooded the physically expanding city from New 
England, from the countryside of upstate New York, and from 
overseas, to the point where by 1860 it had 813,660 residents. 
Thus, by 1860 New York City was America’s financial and social 
capital, the “capital of capital” as historian John Strausbaugh 
put it.1 1860 Philadelphia had a population of 565,529, behind 
only London, Paris, and New York City. Like New York City and 
most northern metropolises, its immigrants were primarily Irish 
and German (16.7 and 7.5 percent in Philadelphia, respectively.) 
However, unlike New York City, it had a vibrant native-born 
citizenry, whether anti-slavery heirs of the City of Brotherly 
Love’s Quaker founders, members of its 400 churches and nearly 
one thousand organized lodges, clubs, and benefit associations, 
or Southern businessmen moving North for greater economic 
opportunities.2 For these long-time Philadelphia residents, the 
Civil War, and the resulting political and social changes to their 
city, would be a time of reckoning for their long-held beliefs. 
 As national centers of commerce and society, New York 
City and Philadelphia are crucial to understanding the national 
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political and ideological changes and movements that occurred 
during the Civil War. Throughout the war, both cities would 
serve as microcosms for the political and ideological changes 
that befell the rest of the Union. In the historical memory and 
common knowledge of New York City and Philadelphia during 
the war, the two cities have acquired contrasting perceptions. 
New York City, in large part thanks to its well-documented 
draft riots, is perceived as a disloyal, racist city. Philadelphia, 
in large part thanks to its colonial legacy and lack of similar 
riots or anti-Lincoln actions, is perceived as a loyal and pro-war 
city. In reality, however, the truth about each city’s loyalty and 
disloyalty is somewhere between the reputations given to them 
by the passage of time. Neither New York City nor Philadelphia 
fit into the perfect picture of the “loyal city” or “disloyal city” 
that they have been placed into by popular memory. Both cities 
faced pitched electoral clashes that could have easily taken their 
cities in different political directions, and no political outcome 
in either city was preordained.  
 Comparatively studying New York City and 
Philadelphia revealed the fascinating differences with which 
politically active citizens, especially elected officials and 
party leaders, positioned themselves in relation to the war 
effort. Yet, one facet that united political actors divided by 
different viewpoints and residing in different cities was their 
use of definitions of loyalty and disloyalty. Analyzing either 
city through definitions of loyalty and disloyalty is a rare 
historiographical occurrence; nevertheless, conceptions of 
loyalty and disloyalty are crucial for this study. In a conflict as 
divisive as the Civil War, both cities were split between many 
vocal factions that argued they were the only ones truly loyal 
to the nation while their opponents were just disloyal agitators. 
They also sought to control and alter situations when the 
disloyalty label was directed at them. Thus, this work will be a 
critical reinterpretation of how we, now over 155 years since the 
end of the Civil War, see those who practiced politics in New 
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York City and Philadelphia during the conflict. 
 Even those actors already given some scholarly 
treatment deserve to be recontextualized within the framework 
of loyalty and disloyalty. The New York City or Philadelphia 
leader who receives the most scholarly treatment is Fernando 
Wood. Twice elected mayor of New York City, including serving 
as its first war-time mayor, and later a congressman, Wood is 
the focus of two well-researched books, various articles, and 
plays an integral role in most stories of New York City during 
the war. While most of the works repeat facts and arguments 
about his life story, there is a notable disagreement that this 
thesis will relitigate and seek to solve. Was Wood a disloyal, 
political opportunist masking or deploying his opposition to 
the war at different times when it was politically advantageous, 
or was he a loyal leader who stuck by his principles even forced 
to adapt to changing circumstances like everyone else? All in 
all, through Wood’s winding wartime career while there were 
shades of the latter, he was a politician first, willing to sacrifice 
his party and principles, and in one case his state’s safety, for 
political gain. Other political actors of different degrees of 
notoriety will also be recontextualized within this question, and 
while they all were political opportunists to varying degrees, 
none were as overtly duplicitous as Wood was. 
 Beyond Wood, both cities are also filled with partisan 
actors seeking to utilize the Civil War to push forward their 
vision for their city. While there are too many to cover in detail, 
this work will examine many based on their connections to 
the different intraparty factions of both cities. The politics of 
both cities were defined by constant party feuds that at times 
allowed for political and electoral success, but most often led 
to disaster. The New York City Democratic Party alone had 
three powerful factions, Tammany Hall, Mozart Hall, and the 
McKeon Democracy, all of whom will receive their due. New 
York City Republicans were divided between a more moderate 
faction led by New York Times editor Henry Raymond and a 
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more radical faction led by New York Tribune editor Horace 
Greeley. At different points in the war, these factions stood 
for different positions and achieved different levels of success. 
For instance, while Raymond’s faction originally opposed 
President Lincoln’s policies, by war’s end they were amongst 
his most powerful backers. Greeley’s faction helped deliver him 
the 1860 Republican nomination and then soured on him as 
the war progressed. The reason for this shift will be examined, 
occurring based on the evolving popularity of Lincoln and his 
wartime policies, and what they meant for this intraparty power 
struggle. Philadelphia, on the other hand, was less defined by 
interparty or intraparty feuds. Rather, it was characterized more 
by a divide between a bipartisan, pro-war consensus under 
Alexander Henry and out-of-power Democrats and Republicans 
who wanted a seat at the table but were never popular enough 
to receive one. The reason for this composition of Philadelphia 
politics will be examined. All in all, Henry’s desire for 
bipartisanship and consensus was successful, in large part due 
to a healthy use of police power, which allowed Philadelphia to 
avoid most of the divisiveness and bloodshed that befell New 
York City. 
 Besides political leaders, and their parties and coalitions, 
there are other key avenues to understand the intersections of 
the cities. For example, both cities had a rich heterogeneous 
mix of newspapers that were important for the politicization 
of those who led and were led alike. In 19th century America, 
newspapers were crucial prognosticators and disseminators of 
political thought, allowing everyday citizens, regardless of their 
education or political knowledge, to glean their own personal 
views from the opinions of their favorite newspaper. As Edward 
Dicey, a British journalist visiting America during the Civil 
War, put it, “In truth, the most remarkable feature about 
the American press is its quantity rather than its quality. The 
American might be defined as a newspaper-reading animal…
Reading is so universal an acquirement here, that a far larger, 
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and also a far lower, class reads the newspapers than is the 
case with us.”3 The papers, whether affiliated with politically 
independent or with a party or faction, still hoped to influence 
political parties and leaders. New York City especially was 
dominated by an ideological battle between its three most 
influential newspapers: Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune, 
Henry Raymond’s New York Times, and Fernando Wood’s New 
York Daily News. Their constant battle to define themselves 
as loyal, and their competitors (and thus their competitors’ 
readers) as disloyal would demonstrate the simmering tension 
between New York City’s ideological and ethnic communities. 
Due to their ties to a party faction, these newspapers 
successfully captured the views of their faction and its 
struggles, or outright refusal, to adjust as the national political 
circumstances changed. On the other hand, Philadelphia’s 
papers, while ideological, had few connections to organized 
politics, and thus politically evolved with much of the country 
as the war progressed. 
 This section, of a larger work encompassing the years 
1859-1865, covers 1859-1861, examining how the quick 
rhetorical shifting, by both parties, from opposition to civil 
war to full-throated pro-war, anti-South oratory obscured 
real political divisions about loyalty. While in the end loyalty 
as constructed as supporting Lincoln and the war effort fully 
would win out in both cities over loyalty as constructed as 
supporting a party or a pre-war national construct, it was by 
no means an easy decision for either city and for those who 
led them. At times, the first construction would even be the 
most unpopular view of loyalty, especially during periods 
of Democratic control and when the Union war effort was 
struggling the most. By the end of the war, while many of the 
political leaders and factions evolved with their city’s residents 
towards the first definition of loyalty, others would refuse to 
evolve despite great pressure, to varying degrees of negative 
electoral and personal consequences. In that case, the differences 
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between the cities plays a deciding role, where in New York 
City those who sought bipartisanship failed completely, 
while their counterparts in Philadelphia succeeded. Likewise, 
while Democrats virtually disappeared from elected office in 
Philadelphia, in New York City they ruled for most of the war, 
even after a significant portion of their base rioted in the streets. 
 In truth, throughout the war there was no simple 
answer about what loyalty and disloyalty meant. Many in both 
parties would vehemently resist any definition but their own. 
While I know that my work will not lead to a simple answer 
about the roles of loyalty and disloyalty in political action and 
discourse, I hope that my use of the best of the scholarship 
combined with primary sources to fill its gaping holes will help 
conclude that one’s loyalty and disloyalty could not be judged 
by one’s partisan identification or political allies. It especially 
cannot be judged by one’s rhetoric, which was often vague at 
best and deceitful of one’s true intentions at worst. In fact, if 
there is one conclusion that this paper easily makes, it is that 
there were no universally agreed upon, or even mostly agreed 
upon, definitions of what constituted loyalty and disloyalty, 
only subjective opinions altered by time and animated by 
politics. 
New York City and Philadelphia: The Early Days of the Split
  For New York City and Philadelphia Democrats 
and Republicans leaders alike, April 12th, 1861 would mark 
a turning point from their pre-war attitudes towards the 
Union, secession, and other contentious issues. Democrats 
and Republicans, and their powerful political and media 
leaders, would immediately walk back much of the criticism 
they leveled at President Lincoln and the possibility of war. 
Both sides would go to great lengths to trumpet their loyalty 
to the war effort, seeking to outflank their opponents as the 
most loyal. It appeared that the coming of war would bring 
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an end to the discordant Northern politics of the 1850s and 
usher in a new era of bipartisan cooperation. But, these public 
demonstrations of agreement would be both short-lived and 
ultimately unsuccessful attempts at unity. By the end of the 
year, interparty and intraparty rivalries would resume, with 
efforts by politicians in both parties to denigrate others as 
disloyal to the war effort when it was still broadly popular 
and to highlight their own ideological principles to their 
supporters once it was not. These divisions in New York City 
and Philadelphia would be magnified by the contentious and 
divisive city elections in 1861, setting the stage for an even 
more contentious and divisive 1862.
 However, to best understand where both parties and 
their heterogeneous factions would end up by 1862, it is 
necessary first to determine where they started. For both cities, 
the years immediately preceding the war were marked by 
political turbulence. Old political alliances and ideologies were 
chaotically rejected and replaced, as different groups and ideas 
jockeyed for power. The result would be the transformation of 
Philadelphia into a one-party city, a party defined by support 
for the Union over traditional party lines, though with a 
sizable minority of Democrats and Republicans opposing 
the consensus, and of New York City into a city politically 
partitioned into three nearly equal parts. Thus, even though 
both cities entered the war in relatively similar ideological 
positions, they would, thanks to these wartime dynamics, exit 
the year completely dissimilar. 
 For a city north of the Mason-Dixon line, pre-war 
Philadelphia was in many ways a Southern city. With its 
manufacturing capital greater than the combination of 11 
states that would become the Confederacy, it received great 
economic investment from wealthy Southerners. These 
Southerners did not just send money to Philadelphia; in fact, 
many Southerners married into Philadelphia families and 
directed their manufacturing empires from within the city. They 
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then employed poor whites, often immigrants, and allied with 
them politically by focusing on a supposedly shared hatred for 
the city’s growing free black population. For decades before 
the war, these ties to the South manifested in clear voting 
preferences for Southern economic interests and led to massive 
Democratic electoral success in the city. In the city’s 1856 
presidential election, Republican John C. Fremont received 
11% of the vote, with the Democrats procuring a majority, and 
its burgeoning Know-Nothing Party forced to suppress many 
of its anti-slavery supporters.4 As Charles Godfrey Leland, a 
Philadelphia satirist, put it, “everything Southern was exalted 
and worshipped.”5
 One example of something Southern exalted in 
Philadelphia was fear and, in many, overt hatred towards the 
city’s free blacks. As previously established, some of the hatred 
felt by the city’s workers towards black residents was promoted 
by direct propaganda from the city’s Southern business leaders. 
Yet, most of the hatred felt by Philadelphians of all walks of 
life towards free blacks came from their unmistakable presence, 
constituting four percent of Philadelphia’s population. Though 
on the surface small, they were the largest black community in 
the North, and second only to Baltimore’s. Furthermore, they 
disproportionately lived in wards closest to the city’s major 
political and social institutions and often worked in economic 
sectors like menial labor and domestic work that kept them 
in poverty and near the city elite.6 Thus it is clear that in 
Philadelphia, the controversy over black rights in city society, or 
lack thereof, was more omnipresent than seemingly far-fetched 
fears of secession or unrelatable issues like Bleeding Kansas. 
 Yet in pre-war Philadelphia, free blacks were more than 
just a nuisance or something to fear; they were also a direct 
target of restrictive political measures. Blacks were stuck in 
low-level menial labor or domestic work because of economic 
restrictions passed by Southern-allied Democrats and supported 
by the white worker base. Employment in new factories built 
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by Southerners was closed to blacks, membership in trade 
groups was barred, and Democratic state legislatures mandated 
separate schools for blacks long before Plessy vs. Ferguson.7 
While New York City has a more developed reputation for 
racism during the era, contemporary abolitionists actually 
thought Philadelphia was worse. The abolitionist William 
Wells Brown said that in Philadelphia, “Colorphobia is more 
rampant here than in the pro-slavery, negro-hating city of New 
York.”8 Frederick Douglass went even further, saying “There 
is not perhaps anywhere to be found a city in which prejudice 
against color is more rampant than in Philadelphia...The whole 
aspect of city usage at this point is mean, contemptible, and 
barbarous…”9 Unfortunately, even the war would not alter 
many of these obstructions and the city’s views of blacks would 
alter the rhetoric and policies of even more or less sympathetic 
political leadership. 
 The rise to power of an opposition party after such 
a Democratic landslide in 1856 illustrated how quickly new 
alliances could be created, be successful, and then immediately 
face the possibility of dissolution.  It may be surprising that 
out of this virulently pro-Democrat, pro-South, and anti-black 
political structure, the Democratic Party would be displaced 
just two years later by an upstart party that stood against most 
of its core tenets. But, in reality, this displacement marked a 
major political realignment that befell much of the North, 
but especially Philadelphia. In the wake of Bleeding Kansas in 
1855 and the Dred Scott Supreme Court case in 1857, new 
political coalitions were formed across the North to oppose 
the Democratic Party and its increasing agreement with the 
Southern ideology on slavery. Compromised of disaffected 
Democrats, former Whigs, nativists, and Free Soilers, these 
coalitions often struggled to succeed because of disagreements 
over the extent to which  growing anti-slavery and anti-
immigration ideologies should be emphasized. Those in 
Philadelphia came together in 1857 to form a new political 
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party, the Peoples Party. 
 The Peoples Party avoided the fate that befell other anti-
Democrat coalitions by promising to ignore both slavery and 
nativism. They would only support popular sovereignty, not 
even abolition in new territories, and nativists would have to 
be satisfied with a lip-service plank of “Protection of American 
Labor against the Pauper Labor of Europe.”10 Rather than 
focus on what divided them, they focused on what they agreed 
on: the party portrayed Democrats as the aggressors on the 
question of slavery in an appeal to those who may nominally 
be Democrats, but still worried that slavery was bringing the 
country to the brink of Civil War.11 The Democratic Party 
was still a strong force, castigating the Peoples Party as the 
“‘Mulatto’ Party, offspring of miscegenation between the 
Americans and ‘Black Republicans.’” One Democratic speaker 
at an 1858 rally even argued that if the Peoples Party won, the 
state should go with the South before Republicans destroyed 
the national confederacy.12 Yet, in 1858 the new party would 
notch its first major electoral success, defeating the incumbent 
Democratic mayor and replacing him with one of their own, 
Alexander Henry. Therefore, it is clear that while Philadelphia 
had many Southern inclinations, they would not remain fully 
intact as the Civil War approached. 
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 Alexander Henry, a wealthy young lawyer, hoped his 
term could avoid controversy while using his power to focus 
on his main legislative priority: improving the city’s public 
transportation. That his main policy goal was completely 
divorced from national politics reveals the tightrope that the 
Peoples Party sought to walk.  Despite his victory, however, 
Henry’s influence and power over the city was tenuous at best. 
At any moment, the fragile alliance that brought him to power 
could collapse over internal divisions, allowing the Democratic 
Party to regain its usual power. Furthermore, the Peoples 
Party cannot be equated with the Republican Party; a separate 
political organization used the Republican name to push Henry 
and his allies towards a more candid antislavery position.13 His 
balancing act became more difficult after John Brown’s raid 
the next year. The raid would greatly polarize Philadelphia, 
convincing the city’s previously quiet abolitionists to schedule 
a public meeting at Independence Hall on the day of his 
execution. The audience at the meeting was divided between 
Alexander Henry, unknown author and 
date.
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abolitionists, black residents, and Southern sympathizers, and 
order was only ensured by the 120 policemen sent by Mayor 
Henry to attend the event. He would later use the police again 
to bar abolitionists from meeting Brown’s body when it passed 
through the city after his death and to stop Democrats from 
attacking New York abolitionist George Curtis as he lectured at 
the Pennsylvania Anti-Slavery Fair.14
 Henry’s use of the city’s police force to maintain calm 
between divided factions would later become a hallmark 
of his administration and of the power of the Philadelphia 
mayoralty. The roots of this power actually came from a 
recent development in Philadelphia’s political and geographic 
evolution. In 1854, Philadelphia consolidated its outlying 
communities. Primarily intended to enlarge Philadelphia’s tax 
base, this consolidation also realigned political power around its 
executive and away from its city council. One key example of 
the increased power of the Philadelphia mayoralty was regarding 
the police. Now, each ward had its own police station under the 
supervision of a central station at City Hall, which the mayor 
controlled. Henry’s predecessors had already tested out the 
new police powers, first with the  nativist and prohibitionist 
Robert Conrad suppressing Sunday newspapers and liquor 
sales.15 Out of this recent expansion would come Henry’s key 
mechanism for guiding his city through its darkest hours. The 
fact that wartime New York City had no such power vested in 
its mayor would one day restrain the leadership efforts of its 
non-Democratic leadership. 
 Despite trying to evenly utilize force against and on 
behalf of all political factions, Henry’s measures were wildly 
unpopular with much of the city in 1859 and into 1860. 
Democratic opponents saw him as a closet abolitionist who 
should have instead suppressed the anti-slavery meetings. Henry 
seemingly supported this argument by joining Curtis on stage at 
his lecture as a symbol of municipal authority and fairness. He 
was quickly rebuked in a 16-5 vote by the city’s Select Council, 
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and about a third of the city’s medical students from the South 
withdrew from their schools in protest. His political allies were 
not much better at supporting him, with many joining the 
city’s Republican Party rather than continue suppressing their 
views on issues surrounding slavery.16 Pushed in from both 
parties, Henry’s power nearly evaporated. Based on precinct 
returns from the May 1860 election for the mayoral race, A.K. 
McClure, a prominent Philadelphia Republican politician 
during the war and an ally of Henry, admitted years later that 
Henry was only re-elected because of falsified election returns, 
though there is no direct evidence of voter fraud or of Henry’s 
knowledge of any falsification.17 Perhaps to show he was still 
moderate, or out of legitimate ideological desires, Henry would 
end up supporting the Constitution Unionist, John Bell, over 
the Republican, Abraham Lincoln, in the 1860 presidential 
election. However, the latter’s large victory in the city, a sign 
of its continued drift away from the Democratic Party, would 
serve as a warning. For the mayor, his power as 1861 began was 
a far cry from the mandate he was seemingly given just three 
years earlier.
 Democrats in the city also refused to give him or 
the Peoples Party room to reassure the city that they wanted 
reconciliation following Lincoln’s election and the secession 
of Southern states. On January 17th, Democrats held a mass 
meeting in which they supported Southern secession. One 
of the keynote speakers was William Bradford Reed, perhaps 
at the pinnacle of his power.  Born into Philadelphia’s social 
elite, his grandfather served as Pennsylvania’s governor during 
the Revolutionary War, even as he was accused of directly 
communicating with King George III to betray his erstwhile 
friend George Washington. Originally an Anti-Mason and later 
a Whig, William Reed quickly irritated friend and foe alike. 
As historian Joanna Cowden put it in a very unsympathetic 
biography, “Attributing self-serving motives to those who 
opposed him, he measured their purity against his own 
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and found them wanting.” By 1856, he had abandoned the 
collapsing Whig Party, allying with many of his former friends 
and enemies by joining the Democratic Party.18
 Before the switch, Reed was no Southern apologist like 
most in the Philadelphia Democratic Party. In his biography 
of his grandfather, Reed highlighted his grandfather’s support 
for Pennsylvania’s 1780 gradual abolition law as a proud 
accomplishment for his state.19 However, once he joined 
the Democratic Party, Reed abandoned such praise. Reed 
would reject congressional measures imposing limits on slave 
ownership in the territories. He would also align himself with 
a new home-state ally, the pro-Southern James Buchanan, for 
his presidential campaign. Reed would help Buchanan bring 
former Whigs like himself into the fold, portraying Buchanan 
as a moderate who would “save the country from the fanatical 
abolition which has always done wrong to us…”20 After 
his victory, Buchanan would reward Reed by making him 
Minister to China, a prestigious diplomatic post that solidified 
Reed’s prominence and power within the city’s Democratic 
establishment. Reed would serve in this position until returning 
home in 1859 to defend Buchanan’s policies. 
 Thus, his 1861 speech was a homecoming for Reed, 
and an opportunity for him to stake out an ideological vision 
for the Philadelphia Democratic Party. He and the other 
speakers, Reed claimed, were there to discuss “conciliation and 
none other.” Lincoln’s election had unleashed a “fierce and 
feverish spirit” that could only be prevented if the South was 
placated.  To appease the South, he urged the city’s Democrats 
to adopt a course of neutrality to orchestrate a settlement 
between those “whose fanaticism has precipitated this misery 
upon us” and their “brethren in the South, whose wrongs we 
feel as our own.”21 Though Reed did not directly advocate for 
secession, his advocacy of neutrality and later support for the 
Confederate cause over the Union cause led to that distinction 
being forgotten in the years ahead. But at the time, his speech 
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provoked relatively little controversy, as most city residents also 
wanted conciliation. 
 Philadelphia was a city struggling with many competing 
impulses in the years before the war. In many ways, it was 
a Southern city on par with many below the Mason-Dixon 
line. Its economy was closely allied with that of the South, its 
political opinions, demonstrated by the overwhelming support 
for Democratic candidates and positions, mirrored those of the 
South, and its unfortunate attitudes and treatment towards its 
black residents, mirrored the economic and social restrictions 
free blacks faced in the South. At the same time, antipathy 
began to develop against the Democratic Party, culminating 
in the election of Alexander Henry as Mayor. Still, there was 
no clear break, and Henry struggled throughout his first term 
to politically coexist between Southern allies and the growing 
Republican Party wanting stricter opposition. Henry also 
struggled to utilize a new feature of his position, control of 
the police. Furthermore, Democrats still held sway in the 
city, as seen by the popular speech of William Reed. A break 
would come, but it would take an event as catastrophic as the 
attack on Fort Sumter for Henry and his allies to gain an edge 
politically over their opponents and for Henry’s police-heavy 
strategy to prove effective. 
 New York City was also greatly divided politically in 
the lead up to the Civil War, and, like Philadelphia, residents 
faced the question about how close to align their city to the 
South. Wealthy New Yorkers, predominantly Democrats after 
the collapse of the Whig Party, had a vested economic interest 
in the South. New York City, more so than Philadelphia, was a 
part of a global trading network, and the most common good 
it unloaded in the decades before the war was Southern cotton. 
Cotton, of course, required slaves, and as the price of slaves 
skyrocketed, New York City banks extended credit to Southern 
plantations in exchange for continued access to the cotton 
market. Thus, New York City, as opposed to Philadelphia, was 
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explicitly complicit in slavery.22 Plus, it was an open secret that 
despite its nationwide ban in 1808, New York City continued 
as a place to import slaves from Africa. In fact, a city newspaper 
estimated in 1865 that between 1859 and 1860 alone, 85 ships 
had arrived in New York from Africa. 
 The views of the city on slavery were not all on one 
side of the debate though; in reality, New York City was on 
two opposing tracks when it came to slavery. Slaves had been 
officially manumitted in the city in 1827, a day that saw parades 
throughout the city, though mostly with only black residents 
participating. It also was home to prominent abolitionists, 
like Lewis Tappan, who served as a part of the Underground 
Railroad, and was the birthplace of the first black newspaper 
in the United States, Freedom’s Journal. Yet even Tappan was a 
major Northern trader of Southern cotton. Thus, while New 
York City was likely, as one historian later called it, the North’s 
most pro-South, anti-abolition city, it had an undercurrent of 
dissent and contradictions that would be tested throughout the 
Civil War.23
 As part of a national party, New York Democrats were 
also asked to swallow any misgivings they had about Southern 
priorities like slavery and free trade because those in the North 
could only win and influence national policy by courting and 
winning in the Solid South.24 Thus began a divisive internal 
party debate about how accommodating to be, and three 
camps were formed. “Hards” were parrots of Southern rhetoric, 
arguing the Union had to fully accommodate Southern 
expansionist desires. “Softs” advocated for popular sovereignty, 
a system devised by Illinois’ Stephen Douglas that allowed 
territories to choose for themselves if they wanted to slavery. 
Those who refused most or any accommodations with the 
South or slavery were “Barnburners,” though most Barnburners 
eventually fled to other parties or swallowed their misgivings 
for the sake of electoral success and joined one of the other two 
factions. While other state and local Democratic parties across 
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the North combusted under the weight of the party’s divisive 
policies of the 1850s, New York City’s was unique in that all 
these cleavages would mostly last throughout the war, though 
the factions took different names.25
 Though he was not the cause of the divisions, perhaps 
no one embodied these internal divisions better than Fernando 
Wood. At the start of the war, Wood was a veteran New York 
City politician in his third nonconsecutive term as mayor. He 
was also a local, state, and national Democratic power broker 
who tried to maintain influence as the city, and his party, 
careened through crisis after crisis. All in all, the one constant of 
Wood’s political power was that it was never constant. In part 
this was because Wood had generally chosen no ideological side 
in the great debate over accommodation to the South; he was 
neither a Hard nor a Soft. In 1849 he allied with the Softs in 
exchange for being the party’s nominee the next year, though 
he lost because he refused to endorse the Compromise of 1850 
as most other Softs did.26 When he finally won the mayoralty 
in 1854, he quickly alienated his supporters within the party 
with his patronage choices and public desire to be named Vice 
President in 1856. After failing to achieve that position, Wood 
had his term shortened by a year by Democrats to allow for 
a new election as soon as possible, with the explicit goal of 
replacing him.27 
 All this hostility resulted in Wood being voted out 
of office in an 1857 landslide thanks to an unprecedented 
fusion of the Know-Nothing and Republican parties with 
the anti-Wood members of the Democratic Party behind one 
candidate.28 This anti-Wood coalition was primarily composed 
of members of Tammany Hall, the city’s Democratic machine 
for much of the century. Wood nominally controlled the 
machine during his two terms, but after his loss Tammany Hall 
replaced one of Wood’s close allies, Gideon Tucker, as a sachem 
and forced Wood out as Grand Sachem. Rather than try again 
to regain control of the city’s existing Democratic organization, 
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Wood decided to form his own political organization within 
the Democratic Party. Wood had been somewhat of a political 
kingmaker before by virtue of being Mayor, but most of his 
efforts were futile. For instance, his attempts in 1855 to form an 
alliance with Barnburner Democrats did not come to fruition 
as both they and Tammany Hall were happy to have them leave 
the party.29 Up until that point, even with the party’s internal 
divisions, patronage, platforms, and candidates were almost 
universally determined by unelected leaders of Tammany Hall 
and not by elected officials like Wood. 
 But Wood sought, even in defeat, to make himself 
the decider. He would form Mozart Hall in 1858 to directly 
challenge Tammany Hall “until it opened its doors” to his 
appointments.30 Wood’s first major success was not political, 
but in print. He and his brother bought a failing newspaper 
called the New York Daily News, and quickly turned it into a 
well-read mouthpiece for Mozart Hall.31 Throughout this time 
period, newspapers were often the chief mouthpiece for political 
parties and actors to present their ideas and positions to voters, 
to attack their opponents, and rally their supporters to their 
side. As will be discussed later, this allowed newspaper editors to 
possess a great deal of political leverage and wield great political 
capital; but, the same held true for elected officials too. Wood 
knew that a newspaper supporting Mozart Hall would greatly 
increase his reach and impact in city politics. As a supporter 
articulated in a letter shortly before the Woods bought the 
New York Daily News, “What strikes you of the project? In 
case of your approval I would undertake it at once & provide 
the necessary materials & force - editorially & otherwise - to 
make it worthy of democratic patronage & second to none 
of its contemporaries in point of spirit…” For Wood and his 
new backers, a newspaper was a crucial tool to regain their lost 
influence.32
 The problem for Wood, besides the trouble of trying to 
supplant an organization with a history and tradition of success 
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for decades, was that he had no ideological base of support. 
Wood likely underestimated how his constant evolutions 
had alienated most political allies and overestimated their 
willingness to defect from Tammany too. For instance veteran 
city naval leader Prosper Wetmore declined to ally with Wood 
in the 1860 elections, saying the offer Wood proffered was 
beneath his age and experience.33 Thus, Wood charted a new 
path towards being a kingmaker: identity politics among the 
city’s Irish. This was not the only strategy he employed though; 
for instance, he had used John Brown’s Harpers Ferry raid 
that year to great effect as supposed evidence of the dangers of 
Republican rule.34 
 Wood had always pandered to the city’s Irish 
community, somewhat ironic since he had joined a local 
nativist group in an attempt to coalesce more support for his 
1854 run.35 Although their poverty in Ireland and desire for 
American prosperity may have led them towards Republican 
free labor ideology, they resented Republican alliances with 
nativists.36 Since the mass immigration of Irish began in the 
1840s, the Democratic Party had been their political home. 
But, after forming Mozart Hall, Wood would especially echo 
their rhetoric. He was a vocal opponent of prohibition, seen by 
many Irish immigrants at the time as a nativist talking point.37 
He repeatedly denigrated his opposition as beholden to “British 
stockjobbers,” a clear ploy for Anglophobic Irish sentiment.38 
But perhaps most importantly, he played on Irish fears of 
free black people as the Southerners did in Philadelphia and 
throughout the North, convincing them of future economic 
and social turmoil from greater black rights. Wood’s appeals 
to the Irish would also serve to fill the ranks of leadership in 
Mozart Hall since most of the defecting Tammany leaders, like 
Charles Daly, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, were Irish 
themselves.39
 Tammany Hall made a concerted effort leading up to 
the 1859 mayoral election to court Wood’s Irish base, promising 
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them the share of patronage that had originally prompted Wood 
to form Mozart Hall. But Tammany Hall was still an imperfect 
messenger for Irish interests, choosing to nominate William 
Havemeyer, a German businessman, over the Irish community’s 
and Mozart Hall’s preferred candidate, William Kennedy, an 
Irish merchant. Havemeyer, and his candidate for the city’s 
Corporation Attorney, Samuel Tilden, called themselves “Fifth 
Avenue Democrats” based on their residence within the city’s 
upper economic echelon anchored at the city’s Fifth Avenue. 
They saw their wealth and social presence within the city as an 
asset, but most immigrants saw it as something else. Wood’s 
mouthpiece, the New York Daily News, repeatedly referred to 
Fifth Avenue Democrats “as a kid-glove, scented, silk stocking, 
poodle-headed, degenerate aristocracy.” They were also accused 
of not being Democrats, having supported the Free-Soil wing of 
the party in the prior decade.40
 Displeased with Tammany Hall’s decision, Wood 
declared his candidacy, which he was not previously planning to 
do. Originally running against the coalition that had defeated 
him in 1857, his candidacy was aided by the Republican Party’s 
decision to nominate their own candidate. Their nominee, 
George Opdyke, hoped to appeal to independents and former 
Democrats upset by the Party’s pro-Southern stances. However, 
the Republicans were still too weak, and ended up siphoning 
enough votes from Havemeyer that Wood would shock many 
by winning the mayoralty again by a comfortable margin. 
Disgusted, Tilden would blame the “ignorant Irish” for their 
defeat, further driving the Irish away from Tammany Hall and 
that faction’s increasingly wealthy shift.41 All of a sudden, Wood 
was once again a power player in city party politics, and those 
who once attacked him and kicked him out were now singing 
his praises. A. Oakley Hall, a former Whig elected official and 
a decade later a Tammany Hall-backed mayor, wrote Wood 
that November to thank him for his “olive branch and to know 
that you bear no malice for the certainly objectionable language 
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displayed by me…which is now heartily withdrawn.”42 
 The topsy-turvy political odyssey of Fernando Wood 
leading up to his surprising re-election as Mayor of New York 
City is possibly the best encapsulation of how his political 
power and ideals fluctuated. Wood’s primary goal, clearly, was 
to acquire and maintain power. To do so, Wood had no qualms 
about allying himself with different sides of the intraparty 
feud that consumed Democrats in the 1840s and 1850s. 
When he alienated too many allies in a quixotic bid for the 
vice presidency and lost the mayoralty in 1857, Wood pressed 
on, forming a rival Democratic faction to compete against 
his long-standing benefactors. With this new faction, Mozart 
Hall, Wood sought to encapsulate the pro-Southern ideology 
within the Democratic Party and capture the Irish immigrant 
demographic that was gaining more political influence every 
year in the city. This electoral strategy proved successful, 
demonstrating the popularity of his opinions and power of his 
constituents; yet, it also represented severe miscalculations by 
his old allies in Tammany Hall, their first of many in the years 
of the Civil War. 
 But Wood wanted more than the political comeback he 
had surprisingly achieved; he still wanted to be a national power 
player. Defeated, Tammany Hall wanted their power back and 
control of their city again. In pursuit of their feud, Wood and 
Tammany Hall would foster great national conflict within the 
Democratic Party at their party convention in 1860. In their 
desires for party supremacy, they would refuse to compromise 
on a presidential nominee, driving the Democratic Party into 
geographic factions that ran two separate campaigns. United, 
the Democratic Party may have won the 1860 presidential 
election, especially since Lincoln was loathed by much of the 
country; divided, they stood no chance against an emboldened 
Republican Party. Therefore, while it may be too simple to say 
the Tammany Hall-Mozart Hall feud was entirely responsible 
for the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860, it 
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unavoidably played a devastating role. 
 Wood was what his biographer Jerome Mushkat would 
call New York City’s first “prototypical modern municipal 
leader, a professional politician seeking to get, keep, maintain, 
and expand power.”43 Already established as not content with 
the mayoralty, as his predecessors were, he initially hoped to 
be nominated for President at the 1860 Democratic National 
Convention in Charleston, a long-shot bid quickly quashed 
when the national party recognized Tammany Hall, not Mozart 
Hall, as the New York Democratic delegation. Yet Wood 
decided to travel to Charleston anyway, subsidizing the travel 
expenses of his allies if they protested Mozart Hall’s exclusion. 
Knowing that his Irish base had little national influence, Wood 
focused more on highlighting his shared political interests 
with the South. As previously established,Wood employed this 
strategy in his 1859 mayoral campaign with success, and in 
the leadup to the 1860 party convention he doubled down on 
that strategy.  His public letters with Virginia Governor Henry 
Wise supporting his state’s execution of John Brown sought to 
demonstrate his allegiance to the South and its political wishes, 
and made him the Southern delegates’ favorite candidate for 
Vice President, with many willing to lobby on his behalf. For 
example, Fred Aiken, the secretary of the 1860 Democratic 
convention and another Northerner with Southern sympathies, 
pledged to “use my best ability to affect the public mind of 
the South still more favorably in your behalf ” so Wood would 
become Vice President.44  
 Wood now hoped to be nominated as Vice President 
for John C. Breckinridge, President Buchanan’s sitting Vice 
President, who Wood called “a live & ambitious man, with a 
clear excellent & geographic status” to advance his candidacy.45 
But Breckinridge, and his alliance with Southern “ultras,” best 
known for their support for secession over the past decade, 
made him anathema to much of the North. Tammany Hall 
publicly backed Stephen Douglas, whose popular sovereignty 
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was increasingly anathema to much of the South. Wood, 
perhaps, could have helped convince his Southern allies to 
support Douglas as their standard-bearer. However, Wood 
refused, publicly calling Douglas the “bob-tailed pony from 
Illinois.”46 Tammany Hall would not compromise either, 
supporting a resolution to mandate two-thirds of the delegates 
endorse the nominee. The goal of the resolution was to prevent 
a Southern candidate from winning a simple majority without 
any Northern support, but the plan backfired when Stephen 
Douglas was unable to reach two-thirds as well. 
 After 57 failed ballots the convention was postponed, 
and a second convention was called for Baltimore. An attempt 
by Douglas to withdraw for a candidate capable of winning 
Northern and Southern delegates when the Democrats met 
again was rejected by Tammany Hall. With no hope of winning, 
Breckinridge allies left the convention and nominated him 
on a separate ticket, creating two rival Democratic campaigns 
for the 1860 presidential election. Wood tried to work with 
the two tickets to fuse in states where the Republicans would 
win otherwise, but his efforts mostly failed. Lincoln would 
be elected by a narrow plurality achieved by winning states 
that Democrats, if united, would have otherwise won.47 
While Wood’s more sympathetic biographer would wholly 
blame Tammany, Wood’s other biographer, the generally 
unsympathetic Samuel Pleasants, would wholly blame Wood. 
This historiographical discrepancy shows how one’s view of 
Wood clouds assigning blame for the Democratic debacle.48 
Nevertheless, both sides of the New York Democratic divide 
were principally responsible for the party’s split and loss because 
they chose candidates that had no chance of winning and 
refused to abandon them when this became clear.
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 Once Lincoln was elected, Wood faced new and 
political challenges more dire than his fading national fortunes. 
As mayor of New York City, his first major challenge in 1861 
was deciding how to respond to the growing calls from his city’s 
business community to forge some compromise to preserve 
the Union and the city’s economic relationship with the South. 
New York City’s business community was generally supportive 
of Republican protectionist measures versus Democrat free 
trade, but they worried that President Lincoln would stifle trade 
with their biggest market, the South.49 Wood struggled to allay 
their concerns; this tension would manifest most clearly before 
the war in Fernando Wood’s infamous “Free City” speech. In 
this speech, Wood advocated that New York City secede from 
the state of New York and pledge neutrality in the inevitable 
upcoming war between North and South. This speech would 
share some similarities to William Reed’s previously discussed 
“The National Game. Three Outs and One Run.” Drawing de-
picting the four candidates of the 1860 United States presidential 
election (L to R): John Bell, Stephen Douglas, John C. Breckin-
ridge, and Abraham Lincoln.
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speech from the same winter. First, Wood argued that New 
York City must stand “with our aggrieved brethren of the 
slaves states” who they owe “friendly relations and common 
sympathy.” Second, Wood argued that a free city status would 
finally sever New York City from the wrongs of the state 
leaders (who he claimed were more dangerous than Southern 
secessionists) and attain security and prosperity. Finally, Wood 
qualified his pronouncement, saying that no violence should be 
utilized to help the city secede, but it should be done peacefully 
once war began.50
 What is most surprising about Wood’s speech is how 
little notice it received at the moment. Partially this was the 
result of few thinking a free city would be accomplished; in 
fact, other than reported discussions with “certain wise men” 
of the merchant community at Wood’s residence, no tangible 
legislative or executive actions occurred.51 Yet this lack of 
coverage may be due to a contemporary perception that the 
speech was not as dubious as it appeared. Many biographers 
of Wood, in fact, argue that his Free City speech was not 
a controversial political manifesto, like Reed’s, but simply 
either a “trial balloon” to see what rhetoric was permissible at 
that unique moment of history or a simple continuation of 
New York’s downstate-upstate feud.52 Feuds regarding “home 
rule” for New York City, how much control the city should 
have independent of state oversight, were constant. This 
intrastate tension flared every time new taxes were debated 
or new regulations were proposed, every time legislative 
reapportionment was necessary, and especially every time that 
political patronage was doled out. Wood’s three terms as mayor 
were defined by a rivalry between New York City and the 
rest of the state that, even today, often transcends party lines. 
Therefore, Wood’s speech is often described as little more than 
perhaps an ill-timed continuation of this conflict, and not an 
accurate reflection of his ideological attitudes.
 However, this argument is dubious since this would not 
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be the end of Wood’s questionable actions and rhetoric towards 
the South in the months before the war. His prior Thanksgiving 
proclamation urged citizens to pray that Republicans stop 
violating “the federal compact.”53 He issued a formal apology 
in January to the Governor of Georgia when New York state 
authorities found 25 muskets were heading south to aid the 
rebellion.54 His brother even demanded “total acquiescence in 
all Southern demands.”55 Some of Wood’s allies and base were 
even secession apologists. At a December 15th meeting, some 
Democrats passed a resolution extending “heartfelt sympathy” 
to Southerners “engaged in the holy cause of American liberty 
and trying to hold back the avalanche of Britishism…”56 It 
seemed that Wood and his allies would be a constant thorn in 
the side of Unionists until reconciliation was achieved.  
 As Wood ignited controversy and division, the city’s 
Republican Party sought to resolve its own internal divisions. 
For the decade before Wood’s controversial speech, parties in 
opposition to the Democratic majority in New York City would 
be too divided or controversial to reap the benefits of these 
divisions. By 1860, what had originally been a loose union 
of people united only by their opposition to Democrats was 
now a formalized Republican Party, but like Democrats, the 
Republicans had their own factions. The party was divided by 
a debate about whether to lean more towards its Whig Party 
roots or its Free-Soil Party roots. The former wanted a greater 
focus on economic issues like tariffs or infrastructure, hallmarks 
of the Whig ethos, and less on the South and slavery, the issues 
that destroyed the Whig Party. The latter, some of whom were 
once Democrats, wanted the focus on slavery and Southern 
expansionism. 
 This divide was often correlated with newspaper 
consumption. Whigs, who favored accommodation with Know-
Nothings and former Democrats, read Horace Greeley’s New 
York Tribune. Those who wanted the party wholly Whiggish 
read Henry Raymond’s New York Times. What saved these 
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factions from destroying the national party as Democrats did 
was that they all agreed to work for Abraham Lincoln’s election, 
even though many had originally supported New York’s own, 
William Seward, especially the Raymond faction. Lincoln 
winning New York and defeating the Democratic candidates 
nationwide was more important to both than settling intraparty 
scores.57 That does not mean the Raymond faction was 
happy; in fact, in a bitter New York Times article reflecting 
on the convention, the paper referred to Lincoln’s backers as 
“recusants” and thought so little of Lincoln that they referred to 
him as “Abram Lincoln.”58
 The rivalry between Raymond and Greeley was not just 
ideological, it was also personal. Raymond used to work under 
Greeley and for his New York Tribune but left after he became 
fed up with Greeley’s public embrace of social experiments like 
utopian socialism. Not only did he start his own competing 
paper, the New York Times, but he stole more than a dozen 
workers from Greeley, who for decades afterwards continuously 
referred to Raymond as “the Little Villain.” For the next two 
decades, their papers would bitterly compete for economic 
supremacy in the city, with Greeley’s high-strung editorial style 
and greater political radicalism keeping him ahead of Raymond 
for much of that time. Politically, however, Greeley was less 
successful against his nemesis. In 1854, both sought the Whig 
nomination for the lieutenant governorship of New York, with 
Raymond winning thanks to the backing of William Seward. 
Greeley, of course, would get the last pre-war laugh against 
Seward in that regard, though both Raymond and Greeley 
continued to jockey, as we will see unsuccessfully, in the years 
after.59
 The secession crisis brought the schism back as both 
party’s factions presented contrasting proposals for how to 
proceed, making it all but impossible to wholeheartedly attack 
Wood and his free city speech. Thurlow Weed, a close ally of 
Seward and Raymond, proposed that secession be averted by 
calling for a national convention that would constitutionally 
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enshrine the Missouri Compromise and the Compromise 
of 1850. While this proposal was seeming to limit some 
westward extension, it would have led to the unstated result of 
permanently protecting slavery in the Southern states.60 Horace 
Greeley and his allies vehemently rejected Weed’s proposal, 
saying that accommodation would delegitimize the entire 
antislavery stand. Greeley asked all New York City Republican 
Congressmen to go on record favoring “prompt and energetic 
enforcement of all the laws of the general government” as the 
way to ensure “the safety of the country” and “the preservation 
of the Union.” Though they rejected Greeley’s proclamation, 
none explicitly endorsed Weed’s proposals either.61 Once the 
war began, it would become common for New York City 
Republicans to paper over this resistance to aggression and their 
support for some accommodations. Yet in due time, desires for 
accommodation would return with a vengeance at the war’s 
climax.  
 Clearly, in the years before the Civil War internal 
disputes dominated both the Republican and Democratic 
parties of New York City. It has already been established 
that the Tammany Hall-Mozart Hall feud even had national 
consequences, aiding in the election of Abraham Lincoln 
and weakening the influence of Mayor Wood. His actions 
after the election of Lincoln, especially his Free City speech, 
caused further damage to his power. Though the clash between 
Republican coalitions did not have the same negative national 
consequences, in part because both sides went out of their way 
to accommodate the nomination of Lincoln and work towards 
his election, that does not mean the divide was any less severe. 
Its Whiggish wing, embodied by Henry Raymond and the 
New York Times and its Free Soiler wing, embodied by Horace 
Greeley and the New York Tribune, disagreed mightily over 
the direction the party should take regarding what issues to 
prioritize, what policies to support, and what base of political 
support they should cultivate. 
 Both Philadelphia and New York, already established as, 
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despite their political diversity, broadly sympathetic to Southern 
attitudes and positions,changed their rhetoric dramatically with 
the attack on Fort Sumter April 12th, 1861. In Philadelphia, 
excited crowds began peacefully roaming the streets to debate 
the latest reports from the South and exclaim their glee at the 
prospect of war. Quickly however, these gatherings became 
more sinister in behavior. According to the Philadelphia Public 
Ledger, originally an anti-slavery newspaper that under new 
ownership became virulently pro-Confederate until it was 
sold in 1864, “everyone who hinted any sympathy with the 
secession was made to make an unequivocal stand.” Some, like 
an intoxicated man who in a drunken stupor made the mistake 
of declaring himself a Southern sympathizer, went unharmed 
after leading “three cheers for the thirty United States.”62 After 
a local newspaper published the names and addresses of several 
wealthy Southerners, these crowds marched to their homes, 
demanding shows of patriotism. When one of the Southerners, 
Colonel Robert Patterson, refused, his windows were smashed. 
Others deemed disloyal took refuge in the Court House or fled 
to police protection. Those unable to flee in time were roughed 
up, with reports of one man having his clothes ripped off and 
another having his head put in a noose.63 
 To stem the growing violence, Mayor Henry put his 
political fortunes on the line again with his use of his powers 
over the city police. On April 15th, a pro-Union mob “swelled 
to many hundreds” outside the office of a notoriously pro-
Southern newspaper, the Palmetto Flag, seeking more violence 
against Southern sympathizers. Henry arrived with the chief 
of police and the Reserve Corps to restore order. As the crowd 
clamored for a speech, Henry deftly calmed the crowd with the 
following:
Your devotion to the flag of your country satisfies me 
that you are equally devoted to the maintenance of the 
laws, and to the preservation of order. I see that there 
are no traitors among you, and I rejoice to know that 
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 When the crowds dispersed but regathered the next day 
at the home of the infamous William Reed, Henry went one 
step farther to protect Southern allies. Reed of course was no 
friend of Henry and those who supported the Peoples Party, 
and afterwards Reed refused to thank the Mayor for his help.65 
Yet in his remarks outside Reed’s home, Henry threatened the 
crowd, ordering the police to shoot to kill to maintain order if 
the crowd did not disperse. The next day, he issued an executive 
proclamation asking residents to identify any persons suspected 
of aiding the enemy. This order required “that all persons shall 
refrain from assembly…unlawfully, riotously, or tumultuously, 
warning them that the same will be at their peril.”66 For Henry, 
order and loyalty were one and the same. Active secessionists 
in his city and rioting anti-secessionists were both disloyal to 
him, their city, and the new war effort. Rather than alienate 
Unionists with his executive crackdown, Henry’s popularity 
skyrocketed, and the city calmed. By April 18th, the streets 
were clear and Union flags adorned the homes of those of all 
political persuasions. While some Southerners left town, most 
retreated into silence, knowing that they were outnumbered, 
but protected if they kept quiet. 67
 Philadelphia also decided to invest in its own military 
protection, creating a Philadelphia Home Guard. Philadelphia’s 
social elite worked with Mayor Henry to create a civil defense 
force under his control that would be independent of the 
city’s forces under the federal government which Lincoln 
was beginning to deploy against the Confederacy. As the 
founders of the Philadelphia Home Guard explained in a 
public proclamation from April 19th, just one week after Fort 
treason cannot rear its head in this city. The flag is 
an emblem of the Government, and I hope that all 
citizens who feel loyal to it will show their respect for 
it and the laws and retire to their respective homes.
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Sumter, “those of our citizens whose ties prevent them from 
undertaking active service, should lose no time in organizing 
a ‘Home Guard’ to be in readiness to repel external aggression 
and to maintain internal order.” They would go on to say 
that the Home Guard would be created by the people: only 
city residents, not the state or the federal government, would 
be responsible for volunteering, training, finances, etc.68 The 
founders included prominent members of the city’s social 
and economic elite. For them, publicly, the Home Guard was 
simply a way for those too old for active service or unable to 
leave their businesses behind to help the war effort.
 However, the Home Guard would also have two ulterior 
purposes that would serve the city and the Union war effort 
more than the older gentlemen ever would have militarily in 
case of an invasion. First and foremost, the Home Guard could 
be an extension of the Mayor’s police forces. Henry Charles 
A depiction of the Volunteer Refreshment Saloon 
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania during the American 
Civil War.
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Lea intimated as much in a later private letter to Mayor Henry, 
saying that with his support the Home Guard will “hold 
themselves…to obey any orders you may give for service” 
within the city.69 Henry had already demonstrated that he was 
willing to use his police powers to maintain order in the city, 
and that police presence was effective. Now, he would have 
some of the city’s most recognizable and powerful leaders aiding 
in that effort. Second, the Home Guard would be a tangible 
mechanism for the city’s leaders, supportive of the Union 
but skeptical about the war effort, to have their voices heard 
and their impact felt. Many members of the Home Guard, 
including Lea, were initially skeptical of Henry and his policies, 
even publicly questioning his spending and infrastructure 
priorities in 1860.70 As powerful businessmen, most had close 
economic and social connections to the South, like their 
aforementioned New York City counterparts, and would 
therefore have some justification for neutrality towards the 
war effort. Instead, the Home Guard prevented neutrality, and 
would, until the creation of the Union League in the next year 
, be the primary mechanism for helping them stay supportive 
and loyal. 
 It is unmistakable that the coming of the Civil War 
was a blessing for Mayor Henry’s political prospects. Though 
Henry had originally hoped his term could avoid national 
debates, the war undeniably strengthened his control over 
Philadelphia and its politics. Before the war, he was severely 
weakened, arguably only winning re-election because of voter 
fraud. He had also proven unable to convince Philadelphia 
voters that his political vision, a party between that of the 
Democrats and Republicans, was a worthwhile course for the 
city. Yet thanks to the war, Henry had a new political mandate. 
His use of the police to foster order, reviled before the war, was 
appreciated by both sides for preventing violence and mayhem. 
Additionally, he worked diligently to foster political alliances 
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with war supporters who may have disagreed with him on other 
political issues. By inviting them into his coalition, perhaps best 
embodied by the forming of the Home Guard, his new allies 
had a vested interest in supporting his administration and his 
policies. This support even extended once Henry started voicing 
some more controversial opinions, granting Henry a veneer of 
bipartisanship and moderation that would severely hamper his 
opponents’ political efforts. 
 Residents and attitudes in New York City also saw a 
sea change in sentiment after Fort Sumter. At a massive rally 
on April 20th, an estimated 50,000 packed Union Square 
for a public pro-war meeting carried out by a wide and 
bipartisan group of the city’s political and economic leaders. 
Organizers included all three mayoral candidates in 1859, 
Havemeyer, Opdyke, and Wood, and the dueling Republican 
newspapermen, Henry Raymond and Horace Greeley. 
Tammany Hall would soon take their own actions, formally 
adopting resolutions declaring they were “heartily united to 
uphold the constitution, enforce the laws, maintain the Union, 
defend the flag…the Union must and shall be preserved.”71 For 
the most part, Tammany Hall would publicly remain strong 
Unionists throughout the war, highlighting their views on the 
war to deflect later charges of disloyalty from both parties. 
In the battle of the presses, Horace Greeley gained an edge, 
according to noted diarist George Templeton Strong, since “the 
Greeley wing of Republicanism” was the chief driver of war in 
the first place, leaving Raymond’s “conservative” wing looking 
like a follower. Greeley’s harsh rhetoric towards the South 
long before Fort Sumter was vindicated by the attack, while 
Raymond’s moderation, plus his ally Seward’s desire for political 
compromise, were now obsolete as the nation sought revenge 
against the “‘chivalric’ bullies and braggarts” of the South.72
 Even Fernando Wood was swept up in the patriotic 
fervor. On April 15th, he issued a proclamation summoning 
citizens “irrespective of all other considerations and prejudices” 
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to obey the law, preserve order, and protect property. Attending 
the city’s first “Union Rally” the next day, he literally draped 
himself with the American flag while exhorting “every man, 
whatever had been his sympathies, to make one great phalanx 
in this controversy, to proceed to conquer a peace. I am with 
you in this contest. We have no party now.” He made similar 
remarks at the rally on the 20th and proposed a special million-
dollar tax to support the war effort and create a “Mozart 
Regiment” under his command.73 To some, this sudden 
transformation was clearly a sham and a political ploy, with one 
unnamed critic growling “The cunning scoundrel sees which 
way the cat is jumping, and put himself right on the record in 
a vague, general way, giving the least offense to his allies of the 
Southern Democracy.” Wood, perhaps indicating this hedging, 
argued in that same flag-draped speech that whether the Union 
would be reunited “by fratricidal warfare or by concession, 
conciliation, and sacrifice” was still unanswered.74 
 Regardless, Wood clearly hoped that his party and his 
base, like he was publicly trying to do, could support the war 
without having to support all of Lincoln’s policies. He also 
hoped they could do so within the new demands of loyalty 
to the Union. Yet, voices remained within the Democratic 
Party that rejected the entire legitimacy of the war and any 
bipartisan accommodations with it or Lincoln. Wood’s brother, 
Benjamin, was perhaps the loudest of these voices. Benjamin 
Wood directly opposed his brother’s transformation, using the 
Daily News, of which he was now the sole editor due to his 
brother’s re-election, to scold Mozart Hall’s war platform, and 
maintaining that only “friends of Peace’’ were true Democrats.75 
In this battle between the Woods, the publisher would beat the 
politician. Mozart Hall formally endorsed Benjamin Wood’s 
sentiments, though they would agree to work with Tammany 
Hall on nominating a united slate in the fall elections if 
possible. This defeat by his own organization would send a 
chilling message for Fernando Wood about straying from his 
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new political base, a message he would long remember going 
forward. 
 The fact that such a vocal minority of Southern 
sympathizers persisted surely damaged New York City’s overall 
loyalty to the war effort. Yet perhaps most significantly, New 
York City would not have a similar institution or organization 
as effective as Philadelphia’s Home Guard. A bipartisan Union 
Defense Committee, of which Fernando Wood was initially 
an ex-officio member and active participant, was formed 
shortly after Fort Sumter by the city Chamber of Commerce. 
Their stated goal was to serve “in aid of the Government in 
the present crisis, to accelerate and facilitate the organization 
of forces, the transportation of troops and provisions, and the 
cooperation of popular action in all loyal parts of the country.”76 
But, its impact and the creation of a Union Party in September 
1861 were only successful primarily upstate.77 Tammany Hall, 
despite agreeing with most of Lincoln’s war policies before 
emancipation, also never publicly considered allying with the 
city’s Republican Party. 
 Therefore, there was no formal infrastructure or alliance 
in place for much of the war to ensure that the city’s elite 
who were generally supportive of the war, but not of Lincoln 
and some of his policies, had buy-in to the war effort. There 
was nothing to ensure their loyalty and continued support. 
In those crucial early days, a bipartisan consensus like that of 
Philadelphia could have been achieved, but it was not. Wood 
also refused to use his executive authority in the same way as 
Henry did to silence dissent and maintain order. For instance, a 
June editorial by his brother claimed that Northerners had been 
tricked into supporting the war effort, and now they had to 
turn against the war and ensure conciliation.78
 Under Wood’s leadership in 1861, not only would the 
Democratic Party not unite in its role as “the loyal opposition,” 
but its anti-war voices were as loud, powerful, and effective at 
rallying their base as ever. It was at this point that New York 
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City and Philadelphia both began to irrevocably diverge on 
their journey through the war. Philadelphia came out of the 
first few months more united and peaceful than before, while 
New York City remained as divided as ever, if not more than 
before. The blame for the continued divisiveness of New York 
City politics is not solely Wood’s, but he played a crucial role. 
Though he had publicly backed much of the pro-war zeal that 
engulfed the city after the attack on Fort Sumter, he privately 
capitulated to his anti-war backers, especially his own brother. 
Furthermore, unlike his counterpart in Philadelphia, he did 
not seek to foster bipartisan loyalty to the war effort or allow 
his political coalition to grow with pro-war voices. By and large 
and in part thanks to Wood, New York City’s political situation 
looked little different in the fall of 1861 than it did in the 
winter of 1861. 
 New York City, additionally, had a crucial and divisive 
mayoral election to endure that year, another reason for its 
continued political divisions. The fact that Philadelphia had no 
major elections in the fall of 1861 is another major reason why 
it remained peaceful and united. Other than a congressional 
special election won by a Democrat, Charles Biddle, there 
were few opportunities for partisan electoral conflict that 
could break the bipartisanship. This gave Henry time and 
resources to realize his mayoral vision and find common 
ground with allies and enemies. He could show the people of 
Philadelphia why they wanted his moderate Unionism and 
strong police power. Additionally, without major elections, 
the city’s Democrats had few opportunities to advance its 
bench of potential elected officials. Thus, the Democratic Party 
continued to highlight politicians of yesteryear, like William 
Reed. Without constituents to serve, and thus their sentiments 
to consider, these party elders even championed recognition of 
the Confederacy as an independent nation.79 As Philadelphians 
were beginning to send their sons and fathers off the war, 
these aging politicians seemed out-of-touch and elitist at best, 
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treasonous at worst. In response, city residents painted the 
entire city’s Democrats with a broad disloyal stroke that many 
Democrats sought to soften by allying with Henry. It would 
take another year for Philadelphia Democrats to elect new 
leaders, but by then they were more focused on national issues 
like emancipation and national forums like Congress, leaving 
the bipartisan leadership of the city and alliances with Henry 
intact.
 As for New York City, Fernando Wood entered his re-
election campaign in a precarious position. His “conversion” 
to Unionism caused distrust and defections from Mozart 
Hall without gaining him new allies. While his opponents 
once again refused a coalition, both Tammany Hall and the 
Republican Party were emboldened by the popularity of the 
war, and both called for its vigorous execution. Tammany Hall 
even declared at their state convention “the first and most 
sacred duty of every man” is to “devote his energies and his 
means, with all his heart and soul, to the earnest and resistless 
prosecution of the war, until the rebellion is utterly suppressed.” 
Furthermore, President Lincoln “is imperatively required...to 
take every step...which may be necessary to secure the triumph 
of our arms...and that his measures will be passed upon by a 
generous and patriotic people...without party spirit.”80 Boldly, 
every Tammany candidate statewide publicly endorsed these 
sentiments.81 Tammany Hall was also emboldened by a new 
interparty consensus. Unlike in 1859 when campaign attacks 
were primarily directed at Havemeyer and Opdyke, Tammany 
Hall and the GOP reached an unofficial détente, training their 
fire solely on Wood, his views on the war, and his policies.82 
 Wood’s chances were further diminished when he was 
credibly accused of corruptly doling out city contracts to close 
allies, while also using city finances for electioneering and 
public election funds for personal gain.83 Severely weakened, 
Wood went to two tried and true methods when a political 
position may be popular, but the candidate is not. First, and 
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more successfully, he publicly decried his investigations as 
politically motivated. He zeroed in on accusations that the 
city’s Corporation Attorney investigated him to advance 
his candidacy for District Attorney, forcing him to publicly 
renounce his candidacy.84 Second, he nationalized his race. On 
November 29th, a week before Election Day, Wood changed 
the tenor of his campaign and his ultimate political destiny 
with a speech at Volks Garten. Casting off any prior support 
for the war effort, Wood charged the Lincoln administration 
with the intention of prolonging the war “as long as there is 
a dollar to be stolen from the National Treasury or a drop of 
Southern blood to be shed.” He also charged Lincoln and the 
Republican Party with being in favor of abolition so free black 
workers could compete with poor white laborers. To Wood, 
the Republican Party hoped for the destruction of immigrants, 
especially his base, since “They will get the Irishmen and 
Germans to fill up the regiments and go forth to defend the 
country…they will themselves remain at home to divide the 
plunder.”85 
 In this speech, Wood publicly relitigated his favorite 
political talking points, especially support for the South and for 
immigrants, specifically Irish and German. Yet privately, Wood 
refused to wholly denounce his prior Unionism. In a curious 
development, the same day that he gave his Volks Garten 
speech he also fired off a defensive letter to Secretary of State 
and fellow New Yorker William Seward. Despite what others 
were saying about him, he was “for a vigorous prosecution of 
the war, for sustaining the administration by every power at 
our command and for the restoration of peace only if it can be 
done consistently with the safety, honor, and unity of the entire 
government.”86 Even with a Republican in the race, Wood 
claimed that he deserved their support for his campaign since 
he best articulated Unionist ideals.
 There are two possible reasons for this letter. One 
is that Wood sincerely believed that, despite his history of 
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controversial comments, including his speech that very day, he 
was loyal to the Union and deserving of Lincoln’s support. That 
idea prompts another question, why this or the fairly pleasant 
reply from Seward’s son thanking Wood for his support for 
the Union, were not released to the public, which could have 
swayed enough skeptics to re-embrace him? Thus, the second 
reason is most likely: Wood was simply a shrewd politician, 
cynically hoping to utilize the Lincoln administration and 
its vast political resources, or at least keep them from being 
used against him. The fact that no evidence exists of Lincoln 
or Seward publicly bashing Wood during the campaign or 
diverting energy to helping elect the Republican indicates that 
Wood’s letter may have been effective. For example, Seward 
did not respond to entreaties from the New York Metropolitan 
Police, a force under state Republican control, to arrest Wood 
for the content of his speech.87 Furthermore, Thurlow Weed 
had privately requested a meeting with Wood the month before 
“if it would not make too much talk,” perhaps to discuss the 
race, though no record exists of if the meeting occurred.88 
 However, the lack of effort may also indicate that the 
Lincoln administration had little confidence a Republican 
could be elected as Mayor of New York City; and, there was 
good reason to assume this. The Republicans had once again 
nominated George Opdyke. A wealthy clothing manufacturer, 
his primary pre-war income came from selling clothes to 
slaves down South, and his Whiggish politics inspired few 
allies. He did gain some Republican approval after his 1859 
loss for working with loyal businessmen during the secession 
crisis to prevent the city’s businessmen from committing “a 
compromise of principle” to assuage the South.89 But, as a 
vocal Republican, he faced constant labeling by Democrats as a 
“black Republican” hoping to emancipate blacks and subjugate 
whites.90 Like Wood, he was also perceived as a politician 
first, civic leader second. George Templeton Strong, though a 
Republican, nonetheless described him as a “pushing, intriguing 
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man, fond of power and position.”91 
 The enigma in the race was the Tammany Hall 
candidate, Charles Godfrey Gunther. Like Opdyke, he was 
a rich merchant. Thus, many assumed he would be closer in 
policy outlook and personality to the Fifth Avenue Democrats. 
However, Gunther was a prominent German activist and 
organizer. Though Wood was primarily concerned with the 
Irish, German immigrants made up a prominent part of his 
anti-war coalition, so it was assumed that Gunther could bring 
parts of Mozart Hall’s base back into Tammany Hall. As for 
Gunther’s appeal to pro-war Democrats, that was less clear. 
Civil War historian Ernest McKay claims that despite being a 
member of Tammany Hall, the “War Democrats,” on specific 
war policies Gunther differed little from the Woods.92 Thus, 
he too inspired little confidence amongst New Yorkers. In the 
end, many New Yorkers cared little about which anti-Wood 
faction won, so long as Wood was gone. As New York political 
historian Sidney Brummer put it, in the minds of many critics 
of Wood and his policies, “Whether to vote for Opdyke or 
for Gunther, was with many simply a question of which had a 
better chance of defeating Wood.”93
 Election Day finally came on December 3rd, 1861, 
and few intimated to guess who would win. Each candidates’ 
headquarters were packed well into the morning. Through the 
night, each group alternated between pessimism and optimism. 
As a potentially foreboding sign, when Opdyke arrived at his 
headquarters early the next morning, someone gave off an alarm 
that the floor was collapsing. Panic ensued, with some suffering 
bruises and torn clothes.94 Early returns indicated a Gunther 
victory, but by ten a.m. Opdyke was declared the winner with 
little more than six hundred votes over Gunther and 1200 over 
Wood. Opdyke won nine of the city’s wards, mostly dominated 
by Republicans, but he also embarrassingly won Wood’s home 
ward by one percent and did especially well in wards populated 
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by former Know Nothings. Gunther, as expected, won the four 
German wards from Wood, but did not win all of the Irish 
wards, splitting them with Wood costing Tammany Hall the 
race.95 Without the Democratic split, especially over immigrant 
votes, it is safe to assume either Wood or Gunther would have 
easily won, but with the split New York City had just had 
its closest three-way race ever and elected its first Republican 
mayor. In what must have been an awkward transition, Wood 
and Opdyke civilly exchanged letters and agreed to meet at 
some point in December.96 
 Perhaps real change could be imparted on the city’s 
policies and its relationships with the war effort and Albany. 
Some Republicans were optimistic, with Henry Bellows 
regarding Opdyke’s election as “an augury of national 
strength.”97 Some, like Strong, while happy that Wood lost, saw 
Opdyke as little more than the lesser of evils.98 But most were 
worried. Even with a Republican mayor, the Republicans who 
controlled Albany were unlikely to grant more power to the 
city, most remaining appointed and elected municipal officials 
were Tammany or Mozart allies, and there was still a hotbed 
of anti-war, anti-black, anti-Lincoln newspapers and activism 
throughout the city. To say that Opdyke’s tenure would be 
divisive and contested would be an understatement, though 
what happened would likely have been more tumultuous 
than most would have anticipated.99 If 1861 was a year for 
Republican gains and Democratic divisions, in both cities, then 
1862 and 1863 would show the power Democrats could yield 
if they united, but also the dangers that unity posed and how 
fragile it would be. 
 This work has sought to compare and contrast New 
York City and Philadelphia politics by looking at how the 
cities, in similar positions demographically, politically, and 
socially before the war, reacted to the conflict. The primary 
framework for doing so has been examining how political 
actors in both cities, from elected officials and party leaders to 
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everyday voters, defined loyalty and disloyalty during an event 
so all-encompassing and divisive. It is without a doubt that 
in both cities, despite their differences by the end of the war, 
some of the same definitions were utilized. Additionally, some 
of the same ideological arguments were made in both cities, 
often by members of the same political party. Both cities also 
endured intraparty feuds that ensured that claims of loyalty 
and disloyalty were not just lobbed at partisan opponents, but 
intraparty ones as well. In writing on Philadelphia during the 
American Civil War period, one hundred years later, historian 
William Dusinberre framed Philadelphia as a city that entered 
the conflict weak and bitter. The city was “fiercely jealous 
of New York,” but also of other cities like Boston and New 
Orleans that had usurped its national and global economic 
output. Its only reliable trading partner was the South, and they 
were now leaving the Union. For decades, it had struggled to 
integrate its ethnically and racially diverse inhabitants into the 
city. These internal tensions led to nativist riots in the 1840s 
and a black population, the largest in the North, with few 
economic or social opportunities. It also had a fragile municipal 
government led by a weak mayor, even after it consolidated 
with its outlying counties in 1854. All in all, there were many 
reasons why many Philadelphia residents had an inferiority 
complex towards their Northern neighbors.100
 The central question of this paper, therefore, has been 
why did Philadelphia and New York City diverge so sharply 
and if and how did conceptions of loyalty and disloyalty play 
a role? Philadelphia’s success at avoiding much of the turmoil 
that befell New York City was due to the leadership of its 
wartime mayor, Alexander Henry. First and foremost, Henry 
took what was once considered a weakness of the municipal 
government of Philadelphia, that as mayor his primary means 
of influence was control over the police, and turned it into 
a positive. Philadelphia easily could have descended into the 
divisiveness and bloodshed of its northern neighbor, and nearly 
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did because it too possessed a loud and somewhat popular anti-
war faction. But it did not, largely because Henry repeatedly, 
fairly, and unequivocally utilized his police powers to maintain 
order.101 He also ruled in a bipartisan manner, avoiding many 
of the contentious and divisive issues of the day. His party, 
first known as the People’s Party and then the Union Party, 
allowed members of different political persuasions to feel 
included and heard in city governance as elected officials, 
members of the Home Guard, and in unofficial capacities. At 
times, especially immediately before Fort Sumter, both of these 
political values made Henry unpopular with both sides, but as 
the war progressed his deft handling of the city granted him 
easy electoral success because more Philadelphians than not 
were invested in the well-being of their city. It is no wonder 
then that Dusinberre, writing a century after Henry retired in 
January of 1866 (mayoral terms had been extended to three 
years during his reign and elections moved to the fall), declared 
that “Alexander Henry’s conduct of the police force from 
1858 to 1865 in itself shows him to have been the best mayor 
Philadelphia ever had.”102
 To conclude, this examination of the years 1859-1861 
promised no easy answers about the types of definitions of 
loyalty and disloyalty employed during the Civil War, nor about 
the reasons why each city ended up on the trajectory it did. As 
I stated earlier, throughout the war there was no simple answer 
about what loyalty and disloyalty meant, and therefore there 
is no simple reason for the fates of the actors and groups from 
Philadelphia and New York City that have been discussed. 
In the end, we must recognize that even if we treat the years 
around the Civil War as being on some clear arc destined to 
bend in a certain direction, there will always be bumps and 
always be outliers. All historians and readers of the era can do 
is try to pull back the curtain of time, reevaluate long standing 
historical assumptions, increase the prominence of forgotten 
leaders and groups of people, and try to understand it all to the 
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best we can, as I have sought to do in this thesis. 
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